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ABSTRACT 
The history of avian and human influenza pandemics showed a high case fatality and devastating 
socioeconomic impact on the developing world. The global epidemiology of the human influenza of 1918, 
1957 and 1968 pandemics had few similarities. One of which was mass human migration, whether it being 
troop deployment or trade routes. How much the perennial flight patterns of wild bird had on its spread is 
another question for consideration? The avian influenza virus does not readily cross the species barrier, 
though there is a potential for genetic re-assortment and cross infection. The main finding of this review 
suggest a lack of historic epidemiological data from the developing world on previous influenza pandemics, 
a poorly developed surveillance system and lack of health service delivery capacity to effectively combat an 
outbreak of influenza, should it occur. The developing world already heavily burdened with endemic 
diseases such as malaria, HIV, Tuberculosis and other respiratory tract infections will find it difficult to cope 
with an influenza pandemic. A preparedness plan for developing countries should include health systems 
strengthening especially that providing expertise and improved surveillance tools. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most developing countries, in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Asia and South America are heavily burdened 
with infectious diseases like Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria, childhood illnesses, and high rates of 
maternal and childhood mortality. This is 
compounded by political instability, poor health 
infrastructure and insufficient budgetary allocation 
to the health sector. To militate against these 
challenges, the United Nations World Health 
Assembly formulated the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) with targets to reduce the disparity 
of socioeconomic and health indicator between 
develop and developing world. 
 
Avian influenza ‘commonly known as bird flu’ is 
influenza like illness found principally in wild birds 
and domestic poultry. However, it has a potential 
of cross infectivity to humans and other animal 
species but this is a rare occurrence. The 
causative agent of avian influenza and other 
influenza is a single stranded RNA virus that 
belongs to the family Orthomyxoviridae. There are 
about 15 species known, differentiated by surface 
glycoprotein haemagglutinin (H) and neuramidase 
(N). There is slight variability in genome of 
influenza virus with frequent genetic drifts and 
occasional shifts. The H5 and H7 strains have 
shown to be the most infective.  
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In the past, avian and human influenza outbreaks 
have had severe health and economic 
consequences, mainly in South-east Asia, North 
America and Europe. Information on the 
epidemiology of the disease in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South America has been limited. The 
present avian influenza outbreak has a potential 
to impact health and economy worldwide with dire 
consequences. The regional offices of World 
Health Organization (WHO) and Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO) have taken a lead 
role in coordinating preparedness and 
surveillance programme against avian and human 
H5N1 influenza epidemic. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
A computerized literature search was conducted 
on Medline database with search terms avian, 
influenza, pandemic, history. There were 39 hits 
but only four papers were found to be pertinent to 
influenza pandemics and the developing world. In 
addition, the websites of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) (Head Office and Africa 
Regional Office), European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control and Health Protection 
Agency (England) were searched for related 
papers and preparedness plans. 
 
Historic perspective and global epidemiology 
 
1918 Influenza pandemic:  
If we compare this H5N1 influenza threat with the 
1918 influenza pandemic, it geographic origin and 
source though unknown, “some medical 
historians suggest China or a Midwestern US 
military camp” (Cox and Subarao, 2000). 
Subsequent outbreaks of influenza with 
unprecedented virulence occurred in North 
America, Europe and Africa in August 1918 
(Crosby, 1989). The spread of the influenza 
pandemic appeared to follow closely that of 
military troop movements and re-deployment or 
mass migration. This pandemic is considered one 
of the deadliest disease events in human history 
with an estimate of 50% of the world’s population 
infected; approximately 25% suffered a clinical 
infection (illness with symptoms) and the total 
excess mortality was between 40 to 50 million 
with the attack rate and mortality rates  highest 
among young  adults aged 20-40 years (HPA, 
2007). The WHO and other surveillance systems 
for disease at that time were virtually non-
existence. 
 
1957 Influenza pandemic: 
By the 1950s WHO and other disease control 
agency were better developed. The 1957 
pandemic was recognized relative early with 
origin in China in February 1957. Its source is 
believed to be of avian origin, with re-assortment 
of genetic material resulting in the pathogenic 
strain H2N2 (Reid and Tauberberger, 2003).  
Within 6 months it spread to other part the world, 
India, Indonesia and Australia by May; to 
Pakistan, Europe, North America and the Middle 
East by June; to South Africa, South America, 
New Zealand and the pacific Islands by July; and 
to Central, West and East Africa, Eastern Europe 
and the Caribbean by August (HPA, 2007). The 
spread closely followed shipping and trade routes 
at the time. The disease affected mainly the 
young able bodied but it was not as deadly as the 
1918 influenza. It occur in two waves in 1957 and 
late 1958 with a death toll estimated at over 1 
million. 
 
1968 Influenza pandemic: 
This influenza pandemic also started in China and 
spread rapidly to whole of Southeast Asia. Its 
spread appeared to follow movement of US 
marines from Vietnam to the Americas and then 
Europe and South Africa. The WHO surveillance 
system had warned of an emerging pandemic and 
vaccine was produced within few months. The 
pathogenic strain was identified as H3N2, its 
origin also linked to avian species (Reid and 
Tauberberger, 2003). Closely following shipping 
and trade routes, the pandemic span to 1970 with 
an estimated mortality of 1-3 million (Cox and 
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Avian influenza is not a new disease entity with 
sporadic outbreaks known to occur in domestic 
birds. The natural reservoir is wild bird, which are 
resistant to less virulent strains. However, 
variation in viral genome has resulted in the 
virulence H5N1 strain that has caused death 
amongst wild and domestic birds, initially in 
South-east Asia.  
Recently, cases of H5N1 avian influenza have 
been report in different parts of the world, Asia, 
Eastern and Central Europe and lately in Nigeria, 
Niger, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt and Sudan (WHO, 
2007). Is the dispersal of this present avian 
influenza due solely to migratory patterns of wild 
birds or does economic activity play a role? The 
influence of climate change, the proximity of 
different parts of the world by increased trade and 
more efficient modes of travel may have a role to 
play with the spread of an H5N1 Influenza 
pandemic. 
 
Another question of concern is the potential of 
cross infection from birds to humans and the 
transmission from human to human. The H5N1 
virus does not spread easily from birds to 
humans. It has been postulated that if a person is 
infected with human influenza and contacts bird 
influenza virus at the same time, there is a danger 
of re-assortment of genetic material to produce a 
new influenza strain capable of human-to-human 
spread. A WHO (2005a) report postulates that a 
pandemic can start when three conditions occurs: 
• A new influenza virus subtype emerges 
• It infects humans causing serious illness 
• It spreads easily and sustainably  
amongst humans 
 
How a human influenza pandemic may 
present 
Whilst the epidemiology of influenza in 
industrialized countries is well understood, 
information on influenza in developing countries is 
scanty (Heymann, 2004). The clinical 
presentation will generally be the same, whether 
in the developed or developing world. The 
incubation period of human influenza is 1-3 days,  
 
with period of infectivity 3-7 days from the onset 
of clinical symptoms. The duration of illness is 
usually 7 days but this may be complicated by 
secondary bacterial pneumonia (Heymann, 2004). 




• Sore throat 
• Cough 
• Muscle aches 
• Headaches 
• Dyspnoea 
• Chest pains 
These signs and symptoms however mimic a 
number of common tropical diseases such as 
acute bronchitis, pneumonia, tuberculosis and 
malaria to name a few.  In addition, 
epidemiological surveillance reports have shown 
recurrent episodes of seasonal influenza with 
cases reporting the above symptoms (HPA, 
2007). On the contrary, human influenza (due to 
H5N1 strain) has been shown to have a high case 
fatality rate of slightly over 50%.  The latest 
figures reported by the World Health Organization 
show a cumulative total of 394 cases of H5N1 
human influenza with a mortality of 248 cases 
between 2003 to January 2009 (WHO, 2009). 
 
The preparedness for avian or human 
influenza pandemic 
Most developing countries especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa, South East Asia and South 
America are heavily burdened with endemic 
infectious diseases such as malaria, HIV, 
tuberculosis, and other respiratory tract infections. 
In addition, their economies are recovering from 
civil conflict and uncontrolled corruption, and still 
have to contend with increase poverty, 
malnutrition, poor housing and infrastructure, and 
poorly functioning health facilities. 
 
The emergence of avian influenza, and even 
worse a strain of H5N1 influenza virus with 
capacity for transmission from human to human 
will be catastrophic. As public health and other 
health professionals, we need to periodically 
evaluate the preparedness for a pandemic in 
developing countries more critically and find 
workable solutions to challenges this presents.  
These may be examined from two perspectives; 
health sector and socioeconomic situation. 
 
The budgetary allocation to support the health 
sector in most developing countries is grossly  
inadequate and relies heavily on donor 
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United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 
European Union (EU), the Department for  
 
 
International Development (DFID) and Global 
Fund to sustain most of their programm
In addition, health institutions are in a deplorable 
state and in need of refurbishment and 
modernization. Most health institutions at best are 
comparable to those of the 1950s or 1960s in 
developed countries. The infrastructure in some 
rural areas may be comparable to the 1920s 
Europe and America. 
 
The WHO guidelines for global preparedness 
include:   
• Surveillance 
• Information dissemination 
• Vaccine and Antiviral stock piling 
• Staff training 
• Infection control measures (WHO, 2005b) 
These guidelines are excellent but may not be 
applicable in many developing countries because 
of inadequate resources, poor infrastructure and 
poorly functioning health system. The proliferation 
of mobile phone, portable computer systems and 
solar power technology may enhance 
surveillance, information dissemination and 
vaccine delivery systems in these regions. A 
workable approach is overall strengthening of 
health systems in developing countries with the 
aim of gradually overcoming infrastructural and 
communication barriers. Ong et al. (2008) 
proposed that avian influenza pandemic 
preparedness must be incorporate into a general 
national emergency preparedness framework. 
Strengthening health emergency services, 
communication and information dissemination 
support this. Most developing countries have 
taken positive strides in reforming and 
restructuring their health service in terms of 
emergency preparedness but many of the 
challenges remain. 
  
As stated in European Commission Disease 
Control and Prevention avian influenza advisory 
forum, “the confirmation that H5N1 avian 
influenza in farmed poultry in Nigeria has 
important public health implications for both Africa 
and Europe (ECDC News, 2006). If H5N1 
becomes entrenched in African bird populations, it 
will be difficult to remove. Many people live 
closely with poultry in Africa as they do in East 
and South East Asia and so these human 
populations will be at high risk of infection. A 
number of EU countries have substantial African 
populations that move to and fro between Europe 
and Africa” (ECDC News, 2006). The surge 
capacity to contend with such an outbreak is 
lacking but needs to be developed to prevent a 
high case fatality and contain the outbreak if or 
when it does occur. Most developing countries 
lack the resources to procure and stockpile the 
antiviral drugs (Oseltamivir or Zanamivir), 
uncertain about when it will be required and how 
effective it will be.  
 
In terms of strengthening health surveillance 
systems and prevention of avian and human 
influenza in the developing world, the regional 
offices of WHO and FAO have taken a lead role. 
These have included introduction of the 
Integrated Disease Surveillance Reporting system 
(Perry et al., 2007), and a strategic action plan for 
responding to an avian influenza pandemic threat 
with early warning systems, containment and 
delay of spread, and limiting damage or disruption 
to normal activities (WHO, 2005c).  In Africa, the 
WHO region office (AFRO) has developed 
guidelines to strengthen surveillance and plan of 
action in event of an influenza outbreak (WHO, 
2005a).  
 
The socioeconomic consequences in developing 
countries will be enormous.  Economic loses in 
previous pandemics of influenza or other 
infectious diseases have run into the millions of 
US dollars. Thus, early planning beyond health or 
medical intervention, focusing on critical 
infrastructure, private sector activities , movement 
of goods and services is essential (Ong et al., 
2008). The population most at risk is the rural 
poor who are involved in subsistent farming with 
poultry roaming freely in backyards. The culling of 
poultry and other farm birds seen in Europe will 
destroy the livelihood of the local poultry industry, 
as funds for compensation by governments may 
be a problem. Further, the determination of 
government enforcement agencies to effectively 
control trade and transportation restrictions is 
lacking as seen recently in Nigeria and Niger on 
news media reports .These reported peasants  
 
taking culled chickens for food in deprived 
communities though no human cases have been 










To conclude, influenza infection unlike HIV, 
tuberculosis or malaria, is an acute illness with a  
 
short natural history. Furthermore, its 
sustainability depends on the susceptibility of the 
population and the infectivity of a viral strain. A 
sudden increase incidence of cases of chest 
infections with symptoms stated above not 
responding to conservative management should 
alert health authorities. The WHO global alertness 
and preparedness is a step in the right direction 
but developing countries will need more expertise, 
close supervision and funding to strengthen their 
active surveillance system to militate against an 
influenza pandemic. Early case detection and 
prompt practical preventive measure may be the 
only tools available to effectively control the 
outbreak in the developing world should it occur. 
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